This work was supported by the grant of RFBR (Russian Foundation for Basic Research)
The process o globalization of the economy are going to the first place between the conditions of life of ethnoses in Russia. But globalization is only the new supplementation to the system of conditions that existed earlier and we must look them through together.
The foundation of the cryses.
The profound crisis in Russia is a part of the general crisis of industrialism. Industrialism can be regarded as the meta-ideology of the West in the New Times, that is, modern western civilization, which rose from the ruins of the traditional medieval society as a result of a chain reaction of varying revolutions (the scientific revolution and Reformation, the industrial revolution and a series of political revolutions) that swept Europe and its cultural areas. Industrialism is based on fundamental philosophical ideas and may incorporate conflicting ideas and ideologies of the lowest order.
For example, Marxism, which provided the theoretical basis for industrialization in Russia (USSR), in bourgeois society ideologically armed the workers in their class struggle against capital. Put differently, it countered liberalism, which defended the right to private property and the free purchase and sale of labor. However, both these conflicting ideologies are based on the same picture of the world and the same anthropological model and proceed from the same idea of progress. They are two branches of industrialism.
The present crisis of industrialism is linked, first and foremost, with a sensation (and in some cases an understanding) of the limited character of some key and seemingly absolute ideas at the origin of industrial civilization. These reflect the identity crisis, the insoluble clash of man's perceptions about himself and his picture of the world with the new empirical reality. Man has become aware of a whole series of such contradictions, which cannot in principle be resolved in the foreseeable future within the framework of the structures of industrial civilization. The whole of the civilization project has found itself at a crossroads, and consequently politics in all its aspects. And industrial policy in the first place.
What is behind the anthropological pessimism? Behind is the fact that, despite the idea of the infiniteness of the universe embedded in culture, a natural barrier has suddenly emerged before man depriving him of the freedom of expansion - and consequently, calling into doubt the idea of unlimited progress and constant expansion of reproduction. Any revisionism of the category of freedom and idea of progress implies a radical restructuring of the very foundations of industrialism. This is a hard decision to take, and political leaders prefer to take palliative measures {2}. However, this path only complicates matters, as these measures are bound to explode the ethical structures of industrialism. The most simple solution (and technologically quite accessible choice for the First World) is to freeze development of industry and transport, and in general the growth of energy consumption - prevent their development. However, this would mean abandoning the ideas of humanism and democracy, inscribed on the banner of industrialism.
The crisis of industrialism has manifested itself with particularly destructive force in Russia because of its cultural specifics. For in cultural terms Russia was always a chimera - part of the West, but not the West; a Christian world, yet not modern, but a traditional society; a traditional society, but not the East. As a result the key ideas of Western civilization were grafted onto a different world outlook and bore at times exquisite, but anomalous, hypertrophied fruits. If the idea of progress was accepted, it tended to assume a religious, rather than quasi-religious meaning.
This became particularly manifest during the Soviet period, in the modernization project accomplished under the ideological cover of Marxism. Nikolai Berdyayev wrote in Paris: "The originality of Soviet communist Russia is provided by the spiritual phenomenon inherent in technical buildings. Here we see something truly unprecedented: a new spiritual phenomenon. And an eerie impression is produced by its eschatology, the reverse eschatology of the Christian... Christian eschatology links the transformation of the universe and Earth with the actions of the Divine Spirit. The eschatology of technology waits for the attainment of a definitive mastery over the universe and the Earth, definitive rule over them via technical instruments."
Russia's experience today is also exceptionally eloquent, because the support structures of society are being destroyed in the social and cultural spheres. During the brief moment of the rupture, the fracture reveals what has been concealed in a calm period. We are witnessing today in the industry of Russia and other countries of the former USSR an experiment of colossal dimensions. Study and systematization of the observations of Russian engineers, industrialists, administrators and workers, provides invaluable knowledge about today's technosphere, ailments, death and rebirth, new dangers lurking within, its links with politics, culture, social psychology and even ethnogenesis - the dynamics of the formation, change, decline and disappearance of peoples. This knowledge may become the possession of mankind or may be lost without attracting the attention of the ideologically blinkered Western intellectual. Whereas in collecting this material, we are doing our duty as engineers.
Globalization - a view from USA.
Responding to the requirements and the possibilities for increased global competition, shorter production cycles, flexible national "regulated market" strategies, the growing market and the ever growing number of the sources of new technologies and technical knowledge, scattered around the globe, transnational corporations in many industries have radically reorganized their work. The corporations where the main role belongs to the US and those operating on the territory of the country were the first to reorganize and spread their pioneer technologies to other countries, steadily increasing the share of foreign technologies in their businesses. In the 80s, transnational corporate unions, most of which comprised American corporations, became the primary vehicle of access to foreign markets and technologies. Although the US-based corporations with a predominant role of American capital are still the pioneers in this sphere, they are not the only ones. As their power and direct foreign investments grow, the greater number of corporations in other countries embark on the road of reorganization in favor of internationalization and the establishment of transnational unions.
The merger of national technical potentials and the globalization of technical programs, implemented by transnational corporations are the foundation for the growing economic and technical interdependence of states. The American Committee for International Technical Initiatives is convinced [1] that the globalization of scientific research and production, investments, markets and technologies is a positive trend both for the US and for other states, although it is fraught with a number of problems.
Needless to say, the economic, technical and political imperatives of globalization have created an international environment where the technical potentials of the nations, for many of which they are a guarantee of continuous prosperity and security, can be nullified by powerful competition from the US. Nevertheless, the committee believes that the positive factors and additional opportunities offered by globalization outweigh all the difficulties and problems of adaptation to be met during the initial period.
The increased international interdependence has not dampened the spirit of competition between the countries either in economics or in technology, just as the advantages of globalization (real or potential) have not convinced governments to give up policies that interfere with this process. All governments have long interfered in their internal economies in order to step up production and raise the competitiveness of both the established and nascent firms within the boundaries of the country.
The emergence of global economic and technical initiatives puts in doubt the traditional beliefs in the relatively clearly-cut delimitation of the notions of internal and external competitiveness. To avoid political frictions on the external and home markets, which are inevitable in conditions of globalization, governments should discuss at an international level questions of government politics which were traditionally believed an exclusively internal affair.
The technical and economic viability of the US increasingly depends on the ability of companies operating on its territory to exploit the technical potential and the resources of the planet, and do that as quickly and effectively as possible. Moreover, the fast-growing technical potential outside of the US is the reason why it is increasingly hard for the US to maintain its own competitiveness only through superiority in the research sphere. To prosper under these conditions, the US has no other way but to stand out against all competition and win each lap of the long track of the transformation of a scientific discovery into an actual product or service.
The top priority in strengthening the technological foundations and so the power of the US economy is the creation in the United States of more favorable conditions for individuals, companies and other institutions regardless of their nationality, so that those, in turn, would help to carry out all the types of technological activity necessary for the firm prosperity and security of the nation. To this end the US must create the necessary social, financial, medical and advertising infrastructures favorably distinguishing the US from other countries for the attraction of the technological, managerial and financial resources of private corporations (or individuals) already involved in globalization. This is the first and main conclusion of our study.
It is quite obvious that all the spheres of American society, including industry, secondary and higher education, are called upon to play an important role in this direction.
The government ought to conduct an offensive on all fronts to strengthen the foundations of American technological initiatives. They are labour resources, social capital (the education system, state/municipal infrastructures), as well as the tax system and the system of social security.
There may be areas where loss of a technological priority or market are absolutely unacceptable to the US for reasons of a military-strategic nature.
The government should play a pioneering role, it must be ready to lend financial and social support, both direct and indirect, to state and private sectors alike in these high-cost and risky activities.
There is a need for the creation of special institutes of technological expertise which would take into account the interests of all America's citizens: consumers, manufacturers and suppliers, and be ready to act in accordance with the emerging realities of a global economy and technology.
Any state initiatives aimed at bolstering US technological and manufacturing power must be guided by the size of the contribution of a specific corporation to the economy of the country. With rare exceptions, there should be no discrimination based on the nationality of a possession or registration, if the corporation brings in considerable income to America.
Assistance or cooperation by the state sector with private (US or foreign) corporations aimed at reaching national goals must be based on rules governing America's economy. It would be quite appropriate for the government to work out criteria which would meet the interests of the nation and apply to all the enterprises using state funds or privileges. In a global economy with globally operating corporations, the nationality of a corporation is not a measure of its real or potential contribution to the US economy. Non-discrimination must be the chief principle of the state policy of the USA. However circumstances may arise when the government will have to take some discriminatory action against non-American firms in order to encourage a proper attitude towards US firms operating abroad or in the interests of national security.
State and federal governments ought to redouble their efforts to modernize and strengthen the labour resources of the country and the state infrastructure, as well as to encourage continuous plant retooling and updating in private industry. The globalization of technologies we are witnessing in the world and the resulting intensified competition between firms and countries give special meaning to these stale recommendations. New technology will not of itself create either the wealth or production growth necessary for raising the living standards of US citizens or national competitiveness. These tasks require greater attention to social and individual resources, the creators of the technological potential and commercial viability of both America's own and US-based corporations. Very essential are state sector investments in the system of public education and the infrastructures responsible for the material sphere (labour legislation, social security and the like).
In the final analysis, the nation's ability not to lose its due profit share of global technological initiative will principally depend on how the corporations operating on its territory can exploit the advantages the emerging global technological base, or aggregate technological potential offered today. However their success or failure will depend on to what extent US politicians will recognize the interdependence of the aspects of domestic and foreign policy influencing the development and penetration of technologies, and commercialization.
The unification of former competitors in some industries and the mounting difficulties in the way of appearance on the market as a result of a multiple rise in the cost of equipment development create a space in which anti-competitive behavior is becoming ever more likely.
Globalization - a view from Russia.
What do these analyses and extensive excerpts from the reports of US system analysts really mean to us? What do they determine in the choice of a strategy for Russia?
They show that the world is undergoing profound, system-specific and extremely important changes for all. They affect not only politics and the economy under-lying it, but also the deep-going spheres which, in turn, form the basis of the latter: from the religious and culturological sphere down to the profound psychology and essence of man. These changes require a close look at a new picture of the world, geopolitics, ethnodynamics, the nature of society, ethnopsychology and anthropology. They no longer allow us to ignore scientific Russian studies or the theories of Russia, the Russian religious and philosophical system or Orthodox anthropology, which went underground when, with the revolutions, science lost its independence, became fully politicized and began to cater to private party/clan interest. Yet, Russian thought and spiritual tradition were always based on a global approach.
These changes are absolutely not of the kind which the Russian mass media, ideologists and scientific experts would have us believe. It is becoming ever more obvious that the Russian reformers have not been acting adequately, that Russian society is uncritical and unamenable to correction. In an attempt to get rid of some previous myths and losing its old meanings, it has made no steps towards realism or towards generalizing its own thousand-year experience, but is getting immersed in other, new myths and becoming encoded with new, not comprehended by it, meanings, which is directly connected with a loss of identity. Remaining traditional, Russian society, including a part of its romantic reformers who are trying to break it to its foundations in order to build from the debris a new world - a civil society - still awaits this new world as a global traditional society, i.e., a family of peoples led by a father (USA) ready to forsake its own interests, if not to sacrifice itself, for the sick children, one of which Russia is now. The First World in the process of globalization and the establishment by it of its "new world order" is not only not such and does not intend to be such, but it does not even pretend to be such, it does not want Russia to see it as such and does not understand its behavior or its strategy.
Of course, the liberation of consciousness from myths, the realism, is an essential condition for the choice of Russia's strategy, although it is insufficient. Above all it is necessary to call things by their real names, to consistently remove the other components of the schizophrenisation of consciousness: delogisation, uncriticalness and unamenability to correction, the loss of identity and the instincts of self-preservation, and, finally, inadequacy, then the last component, destructiveness and creative barrenness, will disappear of itself.
Whereas in the USA, as we see, the process of the globalization of the economy received timely and very serious attention in necessary spheres (the entrepreneurial, that of the scientific experts and, at least partially, the managerial and governmental ones) and caused the elaboration of adequate national-strategy assumptions, in the USSR it was not properly assessed anywhere while Soviet global studies concentrated on fashionable deflecting issues (for example: What will happen when the icepacks of Antarctica melt?).
Meanwhile, beginning in 1975, after the conclusion of the Helsinki Agreement, conditions in foreign policy opened opportunities for our country to join the process of globalization of the economy and technology in time and prepare in a comprehensive way for global competition and other attendant difficulties, understanding the most important thing: that the lot of outsiders in a globalized economy is terrible (and this understanding throws light on the concepts of New World Order and Golden Billion).
That was a circumstance of extreme importance, because almost throughout the 20th century foreign policy conditions were a limiting and a system-molding factor of the economic development of Russia-USSR. The second most influential factor was internal political conditions. Together they shaped the economy of Russia-USSR as a forced economy (a zug-zwang-economy: all are forced steps). Russia's first and only scientist/industrializer and systems analyst, the outstanding Russian "political economist" as he called himself ("I am not chemist, but a political economist. Never mind "The Principles of Chemistry". Take "The Explanatory Tariff" - that's a different thing!"), Dmitri Mendeleyev identified and forecast in 1906 in one of his numerous (about 100) books and articles in a Russian-studies series ("Towards Learning Russia" [47]) the character of the social and economic life of 20th-century Russia as a forced "military life."
One can assess on the basis of the theory of indistinct sets the relative portions of free and forced shaping of the industrial policy of Russia-USSR in the 20th century, using because of the "blurred" nature of the data and the poor definability of the object the following linguistic variables or their "medians": absolutely (about 100%), fully (85-90%), quite (75-85%), basically (65-75%), mainly (55-65%) and semi(45-55%) free or forced economy.
The periods of hot, cold, civil wars and revolutions, of economic dislocations and rehabilitations are so dense that they left only three narrow time stretches for the relatively free molding of industrial policy and economy (a free economy). An integral appraisal spanning the whole of the 20th century yields the following relationship: a 75% forced and only a 25% free economy. It likewise reveals the time of a quite forced economy as completely prevalent, while the brief spells of time, when conditions arose for a mainly free or even a quite free economy, were used in a rather uninspired and voluntarist manner. Group egoistic political interests, whether class, party or clan, totally supplanted the nonpoliticised, natural-science, system knowledge of Russia (USSR). It is precisely in the free economy that, paradoxically enough, a typically Russian drawback, noted way back by Mendeleyev, manifested itself each time: "independent decision-making and practical resourcefulness in respect to our factory business" that had showed itself in a fully forced economy would disappear, and there would arise instead some "crude imitation" and following the fashion, which previously "did not lead to agricultural success, but only ruined a lot of people" [2, XX, 31]. (Perhaps at the base of the paradox lies a Russian deeply-ingrained ethnopsychological peculiarity: the generally normal conditions are for the Russian ethnos passivating, while the norm of the ethnos for creativity is extreme conditions, moreover, it "best succeeds in unrealizable undertakings," according to the subtle and significant observation of Admiral Makarov.)
Two outstanding natural scientist/system analysts who are connoisseurs of Russia - Mendeleyev and Fridtjof Nansen - almost equally defined at the start of the century the geopolitical state of Russia for the 20th century as dangerous. The present-day reader has got used to facile publications by politicized journalists and scientific workers, whose irresponsibility a priori does not presuppose any serious reading of their writings. It is therefore necessary to perceive the thoughts of the brilliant scientist, his text, behind each word of which there is a "fathomless abyss of space" of meanings, of concentrates of system-analysis-based processing of enormous tracts of socioempirical evidence, generalizations and key prognostic conclusions by the system analyst for a "very, very long term," including our time. Nor should we forget that the exposition is in the language of a then not yet created field of mathematics - the theory of indistinct sets (other languages are inadequate to such indistinct objects) and that the indistinct appraisals of magnitudes (for example, of time - "for a very, very long term,") are linguistic variables. Mendeleyev observes [2,XXI,385]:
"Always and in every matter for the fullness of understanding of the actions being carried out therein it is highly useful to do some reckoning-up, and when, as right now here in this country on a national scale, something unusual has happened, when it concerns most voices and forces of the country and when in it there come largely new practices, then the reckoning-up of the existing is not only useful, but simply unavoidably required for anyone who has any wish to live as a conscious member of his homeland, because the whole is always not very visible, that is, does not strike the eye by itself. Otherwise, because of crude copying, we may well be in for new troubles and a mismatch with what there is in evidence and what requires its own consequences and conscious desires, aspirations, discussions and activities. For our country is very peculiar after all, standing as it is between the hammer of Europe and the anvil of Asia..."
"As a fundamentally convinced realist I am one of the now-few opponents of all wars, advocates of a peaceful settlement of all international conflicts. But I do not think all this means that disarmament of a country could be undertaken straight away, not even for such a land-abundant country as Russia. It is a tidbit for its Eastern and Western neighbors, just because it is so abundant in land, and its integrity has to be protected with all popular resources... We have yet for a very, very long time to be a nation ready each minute for war, even if we ourselves would not want it... Though I am much in sympathy with this striving for universal peace for which the church prays every day, I can understand perfectly well why the Russian people treats without any great trust all the peaceloving tendencies; it seems to see in this a discrepancy with the actual reality, threatening precisely us more than anyone else in the world with actions of a military life..."
The system-thinking geographer Fridtjof Nansen (we shall note that among the sciences of the early century only geography was a well-established system science), having made an exploratory tour of Russia and the Far East, arrived at the conclusion: in this century Russia was in for a heavy conflict with the East, and in order to withstand it, it would have to mobilize all its best physical and intellectual forces, but this would not be enough - it would need the unified assistance of the whole of Europe. As is known, instead of all this Russia received in the 20th century the destructive actions of formidable internal forces, revolutions, a civil war, economic dislocation and the extermination of its best physical and intellectual resources, while from Europe it received the based-on-Europe's resources hitlerite blows with the "hammer," of which the realist Mendeleyev had warned. Not just Japan and the territory of China it occupied served as the "anvil," but also Turkey and with it potentially the entire Islamic world (the 1920s showed its readiness for awakening and explosion).
From the 1904-1905 war and the First Revolution onwards, Russia found itself in the state of a hundred-year hot/cold war on four interrelated fronts: the Western, Eastern, Southern and internal. Moreover, for only 8 years of the world hot wars it was taken into a bloc (the Anglo-Saxon - both times due to the need for cannon fodder), and throughout the rest of the time, contrary to Nansen, it faced an array of forces of four other major ethnoses (nations) of the world and their numerous satellites.
The root of the conflict, contrary to propagandist-ideological suggestions, does not lie in the formative confrontations of tsarism (Russian imperialism) and republicanism, feudalism and capitalism, capitalism and socialism, communism and democracy and so forth, though they were of definite and no small importance. Its basis was different - ethnocultural, or, as they say, cultural-historical (a conflict of civilizations), just as had been the case for a thousand years. Russia defended its right to life, the character and form of which are determined in natural-history terms by its ethnogeographical environment and directly by its social "genotype," more precisely - its sociogenome matrix as a natural (that is, formed and preserved in the shape of a traditional society) polyconfessional and polyethnic Eurasian symbiosis (a Russian superethnos), naturally and historically established (and selection-tested) on the basis of the agrarian-military in its archetype, and leader-and-herd in its social biotype, Russian people. Dmitri Mendeleyev expressed this supreme task very aptly and simply: "To survive and continue its independent growth" [2, XX, 31]. It is this cardinal supreme task - Russia's global challenge of the 20th century - that determined and still determines the forced choice of a strategy for Russian policy in general and industrial policy in particular.
It should be noted that, in solving its own supreme task, Russia (USSR) was involuntarily performing at the same time its biosphero-noospherical function as a guarantor of the ethnogeographical and ethnocultural diversity of the world, which is the foundation of global stability and development (i.e. noogenesis). It's not quite clear why historically it happened so, but there is no other guarantor - and this in the conditions of growing monoculturisation by Eurocentrism (in the second half of the 20th century - in the form of Americanization). Therefore the current period of trouble in Russia (a process periodically recurrent every four hundred years or so with the change of cycles), i.e. today's passionate condition of Russia, unlike the previous ones, is for once a neogenetic breakdown [3] fraught with homicide. We already see some features of archaisation - that path of dynamics of a passionate condition which, as is well known [4], is the dynamics of collapsing. The historical collapse and death of Russia would be (will be) the collapse of history. It is necessary to remember that homicide is a biogeochemically programmed finale of fulfillment by mankind of its biospherical function as some particular living matter in the meaning of Vernadsky: regeneration from geochemical dead-ends ("deposits") of loosely-cyclical (substantially disengaged from the cycle) organogenic elements (the main elements of living matter) - carbon and phosphorus. In this function lies one of the "highest meanings of industry" (Mendeleyev). A change of this finale, spontaneously predetermined in the technosphere, is theoretically possible in the noosphere - thanks to reason and the power of will. However a noogenetic breakdown in the meaning of Khoruzhy [3, 4] will remove such a theoretical possibility.
The 20th century and Russia's one-hundred-year war are only the last stage and culminating point of the 400-year process of the Westernisation of Russia (since the 1592 bull of the Pope). This political, confessional, economic and military onslaught by the West on Russia, the "Westernisation of Moskoviya" Toynbee calls very aptly an exposure to West European cultural radiation [5]. The same Toynbee also notes that this was not a completely forcible expansion like the crusades or the "Westernisation" of America. Russia-Ancient Russia, having completed its previous 400-year, Tartar cycle (13th-16th centuries) and entered the new 400-year, Western cycle, from the 17th century on was itself thirsting for Westernisation. a process which can be described as self-Westernisation. It was already Ivan the Terrible, the man who rounded off the Tartar cycle of Russia-Ancient Russia as the great-great-grandson of both Dmitry Donskoi and Mamai (on the mother's side he was of the Glinsky family) and who declared himself a German. And beginning with Peter the Great Russia's impulse towards Westernisation can only be called wildly frenetic. In the 20th century the self-Westernisation of Russia was of necessity conducted so intensively that it often skirted on the edge of suicide. It is a profound mistake to think that it was the will of Ivan IV, Peter I, Lenin, the other Westernisers, parties, agents of influence or Russian ethnos-leaders of Westernisation (the Russian Germans in the 19th century and the Russian Jews who supplanted them in the 20th century). It is the will to live of a Russian ethnos (as registered by sociological studies [6]) walking along a knife-edge ("between Europe's hammer and Asia's anvil") which historically knows how to combine the incompatible - in this case: Westernisation with the preservation of identity, a process noted way back by Marx, and in the previous cycles - Osternisation-Tartarisation [13th-16th centuries], which the Eurasians noted, especially P. Savitsky, Byzantinisation-Christianisation (8th-11th cc), Normannisation (5th - 8th cc), Iranisation (1st-4th centuries) with the preservation of identity. The other ethnoses of Russia, unable to do so, have been followers. Russia's self-Westernisation did not and does not consist of absorbing the European luster to assimilate European equipment, techniques, science and industry, as Marx held and the Russian Marxists, Peter I and the "patriots" still do (take what you need and turn your back). In all these cycles (the 400-year macrocycles of G. Vernadsky: centralisation-decentralisation) for two thousand years the Russian ethnos has been preoccupied and will continue to be preoccupied with one and the same endeavor: it scans the historical horizon, identifies (recognizes and tests) the next powerful ethnos surpassing or equaling it in strength, and, like Ivanushka in the tales about Kashchei (in which is encoded the algorithm of Russia), stubbornly tries to find out the new genetic secret of might, to master it and to raise it to the level of art (for instance, the secret of the yoke and the military and political power of an empire - with the Tartar Mongols, which Marx noted, that best connoisseur of the mechanism for freeing the Russians from the yoke).
At the end of the cycle of Westernisation (the 17th-20th cc), and this became quite obvious from the 1940s (compare Napoleon's invasion with Hitler's and with the plans for atomic strikes at Russia-USSR), Westernisation changed its original aim from a partial annexation and transformation of Russia-USSR to a new aim - its destruction. Therefore the use of this term (Westernisation) has become inadequate, camouflaging the new genuine, destructive essence of the "project." It is understandable that the destroyers use ("ably exploit the stupidity," in Marx's phrase) of the sincere romanticist/Westernisers of Russia - both their own and Russia's (who are obliged to understand this.)
The second half of the one-hundred-year war of Russia, conceived by US atomic explosions in Japan (according to President of the Royal Society of British Physicists Blackett's appraisal) was the cold war of 1946-1992 which did not keep out first, even not approved by the president, nuclear strikes at the USSR (which did reject the first use of a nuclear strike), and does not rule them out now - at Russia. In this war, as A. King and B. Schneider, authors of the Club of Rome report "The First Global Revolution" [7] put it, "Western countries will mobilize their diplomatic, economic and technological resources, together opposing the USSR" (the powerful states of the Far and Middle East - Japan and Israel - for some reason were also included by them among the Western countries). It is intriguing that no-one has ever made a secret of the fact of a hot-and-cold war being waged against Russia by the unified forces of the First World and their numerous satellites, having over the last few decades used about 70% of the world's resources, just as of the fact of a internal "aggravating" war, a "class" (clan) war. And nevertheless all the appraisals of Russia-USSR, made not only by Western, but also by Soviet ideologists, have proceeded from "normal peace time" standards. (The fact of the Soviet communist ideologists strictly following on key issues commands from the West, of their tabooness, is symptomatic, and without an analysis of these symptoms no satisfactory interpretation of their suicidal governability in the dismemberment of the USSR and the reformation of Russia is possible.)
Yet such a one-hundred-year war, naturally, demanded of Russia (USSR) straining of every nerve: not one of the remaining major ethnoses would be able to withstand even five years of unified onslaught by others even if there were no internal (most dangerous) war. (US Congressmen used to say in 1918 that if the First World War had lasted another half-year, the population of the USA would have been clothed in uniform - one identical suit and two types of shoes. This is a normal "military life." And this was the wealthiest country the population of which went unscathed by a single war in the 20th century!) The state of the one-hundred-year hot-cold war and the "action of military life" determined not only the strategy for Russia's industrial policy and the economy, but also all its spheres of life without exception. Without taking this into account, all appraisals of any sphere of Russian life are intrinsically false. Without taking military life into account (and only by the yardsticks of peaceful life) nothing in the life of Russia can be understood or adequately interpreted, and everything looks abnormal, cruel, fanatical - exactly what the face of war always looks like (which was successfully being used in external and internal Russophobian propaganda).
We are only taking "account of things as they are" and will not try to look here into the question of who politically and geopolitically was right (morality apart) and who was more to blame, who and how started it, what was the balance of "crimes" and "merits" of Russian communism and Stalinism to Russia-USSR, Europe, Asia and the world and vice versa and so forth. It has to be noted, though, that they (Russian "communism" and Stalinism) themselves were a product of the Westernisation of Russia, initiated by one of the most radical branches of the Western ideology of industrialism - proletarian communist ideology - just as now the actions of its another radical branch, liberal-bourgeois, will inevitably, as if following Newton's laws, produce a new response monster in Russia.
How could a monster not have been born if by the 1930s Russia-USSR theoretically had no survival chances left at all. That was obvious even to the people (by 1933) and even earlier to the rulers: in their own estimation, they had to cover in ten years the 100-year path of Europe (which is unrealistic), or "we'll be crushed." Even now, retrospectively, one can see no way in the 1930s for Russia-USSR to survive later, in the 1940s (the pro-Hitler, which is symptomatic, retro-recommendations of the present-day Eurocentrist ideologues come down to the self-destruction of Russia). Nevertheless, from the year of the Great Change (1929) to the start of the Patriotic War an unprecedented modernization in pace and scale, industrialization and a cultural revolution were carried out. Each year on average between 600 and 700 large industrial plants were put on line. The fixed assets of industry increased sevenfold. The number of students trebled, that of doctors doubled and so on. The ten-year milestones of the level of industrialization and scientific and technological potential achieved in an unprecedentedly fast development within the active production life of just one, heroic, generation of Russia are: wooden plough * world's best tank T-34 * atomic reactor and atomic bomb * breakthrough into space. The nature of these milestones attests to the nature of the economy and industry, because all these are the highest achievements of a "military life," of a military-industrial economy operating under the most severe conditions.
Since appraisal of the efficiency of an economy is made through comparison of the achievement of the aim pursued and costs, we are one way or another obliged to recognize this extreme economy which pursued quite a single-minded aim and it alone (survival, integrity and its continued independent growth in the harsh conditions of the hot-cold war); we are indeed obliged to recognize it as having been highly efficient and equal to the extremes it faced, regardless of our political sympathies. Since almost simultaneously with the unexpected capitulation of the USSR and the halting of the cold war this economy was destroyed there is empirically no way left now we could know if it was capable of transforming itself into an efficient economy of a normal peaceful life. Whatever one may think theoretically, those assumptions cannot be free of ideology or political partiality.
One should note, however, the important feature of the policy of the party leadership of the USSR towards the living standards of the people in the conditions of a "military life." Enormous pains were being taken to prevent the people's living standards from rising swiftly. It was hardly a conscious following of the "culture of Byzantine discipline," although, in fact, Russian (Orthodox) culture digested Euro-centrist communism almost across the board and placed whatever human aspect there remained in service, which was exactly made up of orthodox Christian commandments, this causing the hostility of the Euro-communists toward Russia-USSR ("Orthodoxy or, in other words, the culture of Byzantine discipline and earthly asceticism is the only counterweight to the theory of general small pleasure" [53]). The official ("communist") interpretation of this policy by ideologists was a fear of the emergence of a small-bourgeois element and its incompatibility with communism. The real causes have been tabooed and remain a mystery. Perhaps they are outside the country and even outside communism. One can also assume that they lie in the realm of social psychology. The simplest hypothesis: the peoples of consumer society are incapable of putting up the resistance to a strong occupying force, such as Europe showed under Hitler - these kinds of motives could have a priority with the Soviet ideologues of that time. An assumption by a factor more complex: the artificial holding back of the growth of living standards and ascetisation of the population made it possible to have a colossal social and psychological reserve, and by the time of the utmost, parity-inspired competition with the USA (in the 1980s) it could be employed, while the USA had no reserve for the further raising of the already extremely high (in resource and environmental terms) living standards of its people without the attraction of new sources. In this sense the USSR's capitulation has saved the USA. (It is curious that the 1992 UN Conference in Rio de Janeiro, by placing for "ecological" reasons a ban on the "get rich!" slogan, involuntarily bore out the "correctness" of this Soviet policy and the culture of Byzantine discipline and actually demanded that every country should follow them.) In industrial policy this had as one of its effects the increase in (in excess of forced) deformations of the relationship between Group A and B commodities.
If the overwhelmingly military orientation of the industrial policy of Russia-USSR, which was in a one-hundred-year war with an enormously superior opponent, has a rational explanation in the age of military technology, and then of technologies of mass destruction, the rationality of the "quite" and "fully" military orientation of science policy in the periods of cold wars is rather doubtful. The "great change" of Soviet science in the 1930s [8] ended not only the leadership of the sciences of the Earth and life, which had existed in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, in favor of the physical and engineering sciences (being then and for 30 years into the future the principal military appendage), but also the very new class of sciences - biosphere-space, which were potentially of major importance in the future problem of global security, the security of Russia and survival. In this class of knowledge the science of Russia-USSR, represented by such great names as Podolinsky and Dokuchayev (19th century), Vernadsky, Chizhevsky, Vavilov, Polynov, Sukachev, Tsiolkovsky and other Russian space scientists (20th century), led the world. Equally essential is the fact that in this class of sciences there evolved the natural-science theory of Russia incorporating the applied knowledge of ethnodynamics, economic management and security and associated with the names of such scientists as Mendeleyev, Chayanov, G. Vernadsky, Savitsky, later L. Gumilev and Legasov.
A rational explanation for the policy towards the peasantry, that actual policy of destruction that was being pursued, is hard to find, however. The peasantry was the only human and primary-producer resource at the expense of which the unprecedented industrialization and urbanization was carried out in the 1930s. The urban population doubled (to 33%), the size of the non-farm labour force trebled (to 27 million). Into the agricultural sphere, on the other hand, a flow of industrial products began to return as a result of this - material- and labour-intensive products of primary necessity (before that the lack of ordinary nails, for example, forced the outstanding engineer Kondratyuk, later the designer of space equipment and technology, to plan the construction of a grain elevator without a single nail), as well as technology-intensive ones fundamentally raising the efficiency of agricultural production. Such, for example, as tractors, combine harvesters and other machines and such as fertilizer. However it was not only a radical change in social structure that was occurring, in a certain sense similar to the de-peasantisation that had taken place in Western Europe centuries before. That process had also been accompanied by land being taken away from the peasant masses, their migration, vagrancy, marginalisation, criminalisation and victimization on a monstrous scale - the bodies of hanged former peasants were generally perceived as a routine feature of life, a simple landscape element. In the USSR certain circles of reformers were implementing this process quite consciously as the extermination of Russia, an aim which was declared in the 1920s with absolute frankness. In a less intensive form it continued to be implemented even after the 1930s, for example the liquidation of "unpromising" villages in the 1960s and the 1970s or farmerisation in the 1990s. The meaning of this persistently executed enterprise is the destruction of its genome matrix, or, in other words - extermination.
The break-up of the ethno-social structure from 1929 to 1941 and from 1941 to 1953 was also linked with the passing through concentration camps of about 12 million people, through the army of more than 30 million, and about one million people through deportation. The largest was the deportation of a third of the Russian Germans in August 1941 (almost half a million out of the million and a half) to Kazakhstan and Siberia. However their deportation did not lead to depopulation (while the contemporary deportation of Russians "with a stroke of the pen" led to their depopulation). However sacrilegious this may sound - it was a "normal military life" for the country in corresponding conditions. In the USA, for example, in similar external conditions (the war with Japan), but less harsh than for the USSR by two factors, in the same year, 1941, all the Japanese without exception, numbering 400,000, were interned (that is, not deported but put in camps behind barbed wire). That is the measure was sterner by one factor, and then the portion of those affected was three times as high. Thus, the USA, having found itself in wartime conditions, employed measures that were at least three times as harsh as those used by the USSR.
To do a full "reckoning," attention should be drawn to the fact that the discussion and condemnation of these measures with regard to the USSR is represented in the world and domestic press by an amount of articles exceeding such with regard to the USA by more than three factors. Thus, the "error" in evaluations, that is the degree of erroneousness exceeds 6 factors (by one million times). And such is the case with the appraisals in all the spheres of "military life" (including human rights), appraisals as made by both Western and Russian Euro-centrists - journalists and researchers. Such a high margin of "error" speaks, of course, not of the lack of objectivity, but of the conscious nature of those actions in the cold or psychological war, of which they were an important element. It is not surprising that the Russian intellectuals, demanding only of one side (Russia-USSR to be sure) the cessation of "military life," actually demanded capitulation (rather than convergence, for example) and did succeed in getting the undeclared unconditional surrender of Russia-USSR with all the ensuing consequences. These consequences (the dismemberment of the country and the economic organism, interethnic wars and economic dislocation and so forth) now make the choice of industrial policy a forced one again. The character of the choice depends on the conditions of the capitulation (what is permitted and what's not), but for the first time in history the terms of capitulation have been concealed from the people. Thus for the third time in the 20th century the choice of industrial policy turns out to be a forced and uncertain one.
The choice of an industrial strategy depends on the terms of Russian capitulation far less than does the choice of a short-term industrial policy. Four factors determine the former choice: (1) the main goal - what Mendeleyev termed - to survive and continue independent growth; (2) goal-setting-post-industrial society as a historical target; (3) security as a priority task; and (4) Russia's geopolitical dynamic patterns and algorithm.
Let us now examine these factors in detail.
(1) The first is clear per se, but present conditions surround it with tremendous problems of which we have to be aware if we are to any extent connected with the choice of an industrial policy. Paradoxically, only a few of the people involved in it have realized today that this choice will be thoroughly different in the situation of
- a monolith and independent USSR with militarypolitical parity achieved;
- a disintegrated USSR, which has capitulated, and whose republics are making war on each other (the Yugoslavian pattern);
- an independent Russian Federation that has reached stability and national accord;
- a disintegrating Russian Federation that has lost of economic and political independence;
- a Russian Federation torn with social and interethnic strife or high-tech terrorism, or at war with other countries, or in the state of civil warfare; or, again, exterminating the world and committing suicide with it.
Another civil war is raging along the periphery of our country, disintegrated into many states with varying degrees of independence. Its harassed, formerly monolith economy, nevertheless, demonstrates an amazing viability, and its population firm loyalty to traditional patterns - the more amazing the more pronounced the economic weakness it owes mainly to the overwhelming inertia of its mechanisms for internal restructuring and re-adaptation.
The heart of the matter does not lie in the fact that industrial and farming crews, research teams, teaching staffs, theater companies and other creative units - to a lesser extent - and other collectives continue to demonstrate their solidarity during the shipwreck, while their captains seize all rescue boats and quit the scene. Neither does it lie in the Soviet reserves, which have turned out to suffice at least for the ten years of economic dislocation; nor in the objective survival of the Soviet community, which displays a "surprising ideological unity" - in fact, unity of philosophical outlook and culture which stuns unbiased sociologists as they take note of it [6]. The heart of the matter lies rather in "all national means", according to Mendeleyev, safeguarding the integrity of our country and the Russian superethnos from the repeated deliberate encroachments and provocations by all the influential (above-ethnic) forces and self-styled "patriotic" opposition among them. This factor of the ethno-political environment is essential for the choice of industrial political strategy, and we have to take into account its two-pronged nature. On the one hand, the environmental situation determines, in a direct or mediated way, the chance, the limitations, the vector and nature of choice. Reciprocally, the choice of strategy influences the environment - which makes this choice doubly responsible. Any constructive mind taking part in the choice has to see that destructive processes do not emerge spontaneously. They are triggered on purpose, and spread of themselves, as fire or blast, because any community possesses a destructive potential - especially in multi-ethnic and multiconfessional countries. This factor makes the wrong choice of industrial policy a fatal error. No situation is fool-proof, but comprehensive systems analyses can at least narrow the range of fatal errors.
2) This factor - post-industrial society as the goal - does not, on the contrary, bring major difficulties for Russia. It is vague by nature, however. Social sciences have no clear concepts of such society, and pass in silence traditional and civil societies' routes to it - or at least avoid discussion of these routes. Indirectly underlying this theory was a Eurocentric social dynamism, with a natural traditional society collapsing, a civil one emerging on its ruins to be industrialized in a revolutionary way, and going on to evolve through scientific and technological progress - into a new kind of society, whose features are veiled to this day -post-industrial society, also tentatively termed technotronic, information, and so on.
As the Mendeleyev concept of Russia has it, "all national means" are to be used to guarantee its integrity. Whatever the situation in domestic and foreign politics, whatever the actual socioeconomic pattern of the Russian Federation - colonial democracy, criminal state (Colombia-fashion), quasi-fascist dictatorship, developing country, First World country with other former Soviet republics for colonies, country of permanent civil warfare, etc. - foreign economic priority ought to belong to countries within the "Russian Empire" - as sales markets, especially for high-tech items in dogged competition with the Asian dragons; as sources of raw materials, technology and others; and objects of military-technological, research, education and cultural cooperation. Russia has a trump card here: its language, which is not only a means of communication for the nations and cultures - one of the principal "national means" - but the language of science and all technical documentation.
The competitive quality and prices of Russian industrial commodities, especially high-tech and science-consuming, their artistic design and advertising belong to the essential "national means", called to guarantee the future integrity of our country. At present, the deep-going influence of this means even exceeds the demand for a military-industrial alliance. Most probably, there is no point in relying on the nascent Russian bourgeoisie, as do our new liberal bourgeois ideologists. At the best, they do it due to a misunderstanding of current reality, with globalization, and its backbone-internationalization, whose specific velocity is high enough in present-day Russia to internationalize the national capital and bourgeoisie even before they acquire this identity, and cause huge capital exports. Theoretically, we could expect a part of this globalized capital to return back to Russia somewhat later in a certain form of well-being, if the process were purely spontaneous - which it isn't. According to Sergei Kurginyan [9], the dynamism of national bourgeoisie is determined by the correlation between the speeds of national resource consumption and of internationalization.
Our modeling dynamics of the national bourgeoisie in post-Soviet states in conditions of globalization of the economy showes some new sides of this process. This analyses simultaneously examines the production of commodity and anti-commodity (anti-commodity ,according to M. Berestenko [10] - the undesirable material, energy, information, cultural and intellectual waste, these doubles of the produced commodity, imposed on the public secretly to the extent it tolerates this imposition, and so overlooked until recently in production efficiency evaluations and in the actual price the public pays for a particular commodity. This factor promptly moves economics out of the range of quantitative, let alone exact sciences).
Scenario A. (inexhaustible resources). If we postulate a permanent specific velocity of resource consumption and inexhaustible resources we get a result: the relative stationary concentration of national bourgeoisie may be negligible. E.g., when the specific internationalization velocity doubly exceeds the nationalization with a relatively low specific degradation velocity of international bourgeoisie national bourgeoisie will account for a stationary share of only 6 per cent - 15 times less than with its international counterpart.
A stationary arrangement is unattainable for anti- commodities, with their permanent growth. In the general variant the stationary situation of national and global bourgeoisie are attained through a fluctuating transition period.
Scenario B (exhaustible resources). We regard an actual occurrence of exhaustible resources. The maximum of national bourgeoisie amounts to a sizable quantity, (0.1; 0.5), only in the limited initial period of time and practically vanishes later. The anti-commodity remains the only permanently growing end product (this is a problem of global security).
The basic conclusions following from our modeling are:
1) To pin our hopes on the national bourgeoisie and the atmosphere it spontaneously creates may be a dangerous error. On the contrary, the choice of an industrial policy and strategy must belong to government managerial experts.
2) The fates of the former Soviet countries will differ. The Russian Federation alone corresponds to Scenario A, with its inexhaustible resources, and Russian national bourgeoisie will steadily survive amid its internationalized counterpart, and account for 5 to 10 per cent of the whole in a spontaneous process, and up to 25 with government regulation. This bourgeoisie will be negligible in the other post-Soviet countries (Scenario B).
3) The impact of Western and Eastern states on the internationalization and globalization of these post-Soviet countries will grow. Possibly, however, the Russian Federation will mediate their internationalization, as it still has some advantages over them. We cannot rule out even the chance of Russian neo-colonialism, if the First World - inconceivable without the Third, with an average correlation of 1:4 - is viewed as the ideal variant. More than that, such goal-setting for the Russian Federation automatically appears in the currently implemented project for the reform of the USSR and Russia's "return" to the world, i.e., neo-colonialist civilization. Thus, Russia, with is ready-made neo-colonialist structure, will easily and naturally enter the stream of the New World Order, if Westernizers want it. Yet this entrance will be historically unnatural and downright immoral. Symptomatically, the Russian mentality is willing to accept the classification of nations imposed on it by Westernizers, and puts up with its 4th or even 6th rank - provided Central Asians and Caucasians rank 8th or 10th.
The success of the high-speed Soviet industrialization, which made the country the world's second-best in terms of scientific and technological potential, caused an empirical upheaval in the social sciences, which both communist and Western liberal democratic experts passed over in silence for political and ideological reasons. As held previously, a traditional society leaves its country no chance for industrialization, unless it is razed to the ground with tremendous sacrifices, including public ones - to change the survivors' mentality, as was the pattern during reformations and revolutions. Only then will it transform into a civil society. This social technique lies at the basis of the current reform of Russia and the former USSR. Organic techniques, alternative to those implying genocide or mutations, are kept secret - an opinion refuted by Russian practice. By this refutation alone, Russia fulfilled its historical mission, but did not complete it - and could not, as it remained captivated by Eurocentric and Westernizing ideas. The task was completed by Japan. Free of these ideas, that country demonstrated that a traditional society does not need to destroy itself and evolve into a civil one to reach economic, industrial, scientific and technological superiority in any competition except violent. But then, this competition is doomed to become unequal and violent unless the strong and powerful concede to such superiority. Russia did not, and could not, get such a concession. Nevertheless, a combination of the Russian experience of power parity with the Japanese, of economic superiority, promises brilliant historical prospects. China has possibly started to demonstrate something like that - a third pattern and a third new way. It takes Russian intellectuals - artists, scholars, teachers, doctors, technicians, military experts and economic managers - with their extreme, suicidal Eurocentrism and indifference to their own fate and the destiny of their country (an indifference the mass shares with them) to stay aloof to Russia's degeneration of the 1990s - its historical regress manifest in the collapse of industry, science and culture, and depopulation and blind to other possible ways of Russian modernization and steady forward movement to post-industrial society, a point in the historical environment which is sought by the First World, mainly Japan and the USA. These ways and their specificities in the Russian context have been known to scholars for almost a century, and for a very long time to practical economic managers.
Mendeleyev's comprehensive politico-economic system views the 400-year cycle of global industrialization not as an end in itself but as an inevitable stage ("a certain period of preliminary growth") and a means of transition to post- industrial society, which will at last bring industry, agriculture and Nature; the individual and the community; individualistic and collectivist aspirations; social, ethnic and confessional diversity and homogeneity; intellect, labour and capital; wealth and spirituality - bring them all into a balance worthy of man and pleasing to God.
This is why industrial policy must take into account not only the utilitarian but the "supreme mission of industry", to which we referred above. Regrettably, Mendeleyev's words hold true till this day: "Just as our literature, our top classes are blind to the supreme mission of industry" [2,XXI,448]. In Russian politics, the measures studied by Mendeleyev and meant to prevent "the disease of enmity between the interests of knowledge, capital and labour from taking root in our soil" [2,XX,60] deserve special attention. We know for almost a century that "our government ought to raise a new banner it has never held before" [2,XX,84] - the banner of post-industrialism, as is well known to scholars and practical workers alike. Mendeleyev pointed out that the principles of solidarity opened the easiest road to post-industrial society (as now demonstrated by Japan) and were bound to come into the foreground in this society. This was what he had to say on the road to this society, and Russia's chance in this respect, as compared to the West's:
"Speaking generally, the communal and teamwork principles intrinsic in our nation display before my eyes the embryonic chance for a future correct solution of many of the problems awaiting us on the road of industrial development. They will hamper those who have displayed final preference for individualism as - the way I see it - all major improvements immediately following a certain period of initial progress will be easier if they proceed from a communal principle which took firm shape in the past than from developed individualism to the communal arrangement" [2,XX,326].
Russia has another vital benefit highlighted by Mendeleyev - its vast resources of land. As we see from the contemporary First World, and now Russian elite patterns, the size of the personal/family countryside land plot (cottage, villa, etc.) acceptable to the post-industrial mentality by several factors exceeds the current average Russian standard of 0.06 hectare. But then, post-industrial society will have to allot psychologically acceptable but much larger-psychologically sufficient - plots of land to its middle-class members, and psychologically comfortable to top classes. Though all current evaluations of this space are vague, and cannot be otherwise with no available theory, we already know for sure that neither Japan - whose typology of society, unlike that of US, is ready for the country to transform into post-industrial - neither Germany, nor Britain or the majority of First World countries will afford such plots, with their small territories. Japanese attempts to find a way out of the land-starvation appear strategical deadends, for instance, its computer imitations of "nature and life". Thus, a contemporary Japanese child is welcome to a computer game with a kitten if he has no room for a real kitten. As is generally known, Russia is the only country with obvious sufficiency in this respect, as in many others. What makes its "vast landed resources so enviable" is neither its arable land, nor its giant water, forest, fuel, ore and other natural resources, nor again, huge territories to dump waste in - but the intrinsic value of post-industrial society's living space. Here, too, runs the undercurrent of the "golden billion", this preconceived concept later hastily substantiated by ideas succeeding each other, in particular, food, carbon, oxygen and energy shortages, and environment pollution.
When the impending collapse of the USSR became clear in the late 1980s, Eurasian-minded scholars and, independently, practical economic managers came up with a choice of programs for a post-industrial-oriented change of national socioeconomic bearings, they sought support - Japanesefashion - in the promising Russian social genotype and the actual Russian scientific, industrial and technological potentials [11]. Practical experts said the same, in their own idiom. One Aidak, a Chuvash collective farm manager, addressed the 19th conference of the Soviet Communist Party in 1989 to prove that post-industrial social orientation and a new mode of life - a merger of urban and natural modes - alone could solve the problems obsessing Russia and help it to avoid a looming all-pervading crisis. He spoke of this orientation as a key for all to a systems solution of the whole range of burning problems - food, demographic ("urban women are loath to bear children," as he put it); adults' and especially children's physical, mental and moral health; problems of the family, involving mothers, babies and seniors; of the army, of unemployment inevitable in the coming economic restructuring, and many others. The mind of this practical manager was more open to the actual evolution of these processes than many scholars'. As he predicted, nothing would stop degradation if the conference failed to pass the necessary resolutions and launch new programs. As we see all too clearly now, the making of a new, post-industrial society required a unique, thoroughly checked and correlated industrial policy which would allow use of the tunnel effect [11]. Now, de-industrialization is taking Russia to an archaic, preindustrial social arrangement instead of post-industrial.
3) The recent destabilization of our country moved the security problem - now global - into the foreground in the context of a choice for industrial policies and strategies. Academician V. Legasov [12] gave us this warning in his time as he made the following general conclusion of the Chernobyl disaster: the scientific and technological revolution has taken the world to the brink of tremendous cataclysms threatening further progress and the sheer survival of civilization. The available production concentration and technogenic danger infrastructure are threatening all spheres. This threat is inconceivably great, and can bring forth disaster at the slightest loss of stability. "The four century long stage of industrial revolution is over. A spontaneous linear continuation of the available traditions, institutions and problem solutions <...> may bring the world to an unforeseen catastrophe" [12]. Two problems stand out as the main ones in the whole range of far-fetched socioeconomic programs Russia is elaborating - higher living standards, and human rights. Meanwhile, the right to live - the basic and inalienable human right - has come under threat. Now, we have to concentrate on bare survival, rather than higher living standards.
The actual situation offers us the following order of security priorities in industrial policy:
I. Energy - especially fuel in the northern areas - and food.
II. Communications, transport and information.
III. Sanitation and the anti-epidemic efforts, with only an oblique influence on industrial policies, and microbiology.
IV. Military-industrial security, with established and pioneer technologies.
V. The safety of the technosphere as such, with the following order of priorities: the involvement of mass destruction weapon equivalents - radio-isotopes and toxic substances, such as dioxins - already in spontaneous or deliberate use, in armed conflicts and terrorism, or for blackmail; destruction of dangerous industrial objects in military clashes and confrontations; major accidents at dangerous production projects due to technological wear-andtear and a deterioration in discipline; and stationary leakages of dangerous substances. The technospheric danger is separately regarded in other work.
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© Aizatulin T., Tugarinov I., 1997